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A Municipality's Interest in an Electrical Power
Generating Facility: Some Tax Considerations
The ever-increasing capital required to produce and supply
electrical energy has made it attractive for two or more utilities
to invest in a commonly owned installation.' Municipally owned
utilities are no exception, as evidenced by the proposed Warner
Valley Project in southern Utah. The City of St. George, Utah, is
negotiating with the City of Los Angeles and the Nevada Power
Company to unite in the construction of a coal-fired power plant
in Warner Valley, Washington County, Utah. The plant would
supply electrical energy to the areas serviced by the participants
in the project. Although the final documents are as yet unsigned,
the Warner Valley Project has raised some interesting tax issues.
As municipal corporations owning public utilities struggle to
cope with the energy shortage and seek to provide their residents
with a sufficient supply of electrical energy a t the most reasonable cost, the questions to be illuminated in this Comment will
inevitably surface in many jurisdictions. While this Comment
will be couched in the framework of Utah constitutional and statutory law, its analysis and conclusions will have application to
similar municipal interests in the many jurisdictions with comparable constitutional and statutory provision^.^ To enable discussion of the pertinent issues, the following project arrangement
will be assumed:
(1)The participants are St. George, Utah, Los Angeles, California, and Nevada Power Company, a Nevada corporation.
(2) The project will be located outside of St. George but
within Washington County, Utah, on federal land presently administered by the Bureau of Land Management. The site will be
leased from the government for a ninety-nine-year period with the
three participants owning the electrical generating plant and accompanying improvements.
(3) The three participants will be tenants in common in the
following percentages: Nevada Power, twenty-five percent; Los
Angeles, fifty percent; and St. George, twenty-five percent.
(4) The costs of operation and the electrical energy produced
will be shared by the participants in proportion to their ownership
interests.
1. Kern, h b l i c Utility Tax Partnerships, 40 BROOKLYN
L. REV.77, 77 (1973).
2. For a listing of states with similar laws see note 11 infra.

126

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I979

(5) The cities of Los Angeles and St. George will distribute
their portions of the generated power only to their residents. Any
revenue collected above costs will be utilized for other municipal
activities.
(6) St. George's interest will be financed by the issuance of
revenue bonds secured only by the city's interest in the project.
This Comment will not consider the issue of whether a municipality has power to engage in such a joint enterprise. Nor will
it discuss the taxability in Utah of Nevada Power, a private foreign ~orporation.~
Discussion is limited to the question of whether
the State of Utah through its political subdivision, Washington
County, has the authority to tax the interests of St. George, a
domestic municipality, or of Los Angeles, a foreign m~nicipality.~
Discussion will center on two distinct taxes: (1) an ad valorem
tax,5 which would be levied directly on the generating plant and
accompanying improvements; and (2) a use tax,%hich would be
levied on the municipalities on the basis of their possessory leasehold interests in the otherwise tax-exempt federal land.

A. Background
Property taxation is the general rule and exemption is the
exception.' Courts strictly construe exemption provisions and are
Some exemption provireluctant to extend them by impli~aton.~
3. Private Utah utilities are not immune from taxation. E.g., State ex rel. Public
Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Pac. Co., 95 Utah 84, 79 P.2d 25 (1938). Foreign corporations
may not transact business on conditions more favorable than those prescribed for domestic
corporations. UTAHCONST.art. 12, 8 6. Since property of domestic private utilities is
taxable, property located in Utah but owned by foreign private utilities must be taxable
as well.
4. The Warner Valley issues will likely be subjected to litigation because of the
uncertainty as to the taxability of St. George's interest and the large amount of tax
revenues in question. The Kaiparowits Project, never completed because of environmental
concerns, was similar to the Warner Valley Project and was expected to increase property
tax revenues by as much as $42.4 million. Salt Lake Tribune, Dec. 5, 1974, at B-1, col. 2.
5. An ad valorem tax refers to a tax or duty upon the value of the property. BLACK'S
LAWD I ~ O N A 58
R Y(rev. 4th ed. 1968).
6. See notes 54-58 and accompanying text infra.
7. See, e.g., Friendship Manor Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 26 Utah 2d 227, 234, 487 P.2d
1272, 1277 (1971) (quoting Parker v. Quinn, 23 Utah 332, 337, 64 P. 961, 961 (1901)).
The Utah Constitution provides: "All tangible property in the state, not exempt
under the laws of the United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to its value . . . ." UTAHCONST.art. 13, 8 2.
8. See, e.g., Hale v. State Bd. of Assessment & Review, 302 U.S. 95,103 (1937); Great
Salt Lake Minerals & Chems. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 573 P.2d 337,340 (Utah 1977).
The burden is generally on the claimant to establish a right to the exemption. Friendship
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sions, however, are not usually subject to strict construction. This
is especially true of provisions exempting publicly owned property where the presumption favors exemption and the burden is
upon the government to establish the taxability of the property
it seeks to reach? Construction and interpretation of the Utah
exemption provision therefore becomes critical in determining
the tax status of property held in Utah by municipalities, both
foreign and domestic.

B. Utah Exemption Rovision
Utah's self-executing constitutional provision10exempts public property from ad valorem taxation in the following words:

. .

All tangible property in the state, not exempt . shall be
The property of the state,
taxed in proportion to its value .
counties, cities, towns, school districts, municipal corporations
and public libraries, lots with buildings thereon used exclusively
for either religious worship or charitable purposes, and places of
burial not held or used for private or corporate benefit, shall be
exempt from taxation.ll

. ..

Two separate tests are used in determining exemption from
ad valorem taxation under this constitutional provision-ownership and use. The test for exemption of municipal
Manor Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 26 Utah 2d 227, 239, 487 P.2d 1272, 1280 (1971).
9. City of Cheyenne v. Board of County Comm'rs, 484 P.2d 706,708-09 (Wyo. 1971).
MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS
Q 44.58 (rev. 3d ed. 1972).
See also 16 E. MCQLJILLIN,
10. A provision is self-executing when it is effective without the aid of ancillary
legislation. "[P]ublic property used exclusively for any public purpose, shall be exempt
from taxation . . . ." MINN.CONST.art. 10, Q 1 (emphasis added). A provision is not selfexecuting if its terms indicate it is not to become operative without enabling or supplemental legislation. "The General Assembly may, by law, exempt from taxation all public
property . . . ." GA.CONST.art. 7, Q 1 (emphasis added).
11. UTAHCONST.art. 13, Q 2. At least thirteen other states have adopted similar
constitutional exemption provisions. See, e.g:, Alabama-ALA. CONST.art. 4, Q 91;
Arizona-ARIZ. CONST.art. 9, Q 2; Colorado-COLO. CONST.art. 10, Q 4; Idaho-hmo
CONST.art. 7, Q 4; Missouri-Mo. CONST.art. 10, Q 6; Nebraska-Nm. CONST.art. 8 , 8 2;
New Mexico-N.M. CONST.art. 8, Q 3; North Carolina-N.C. CONST.art. 5, 8 2; North
Dakota-N.D. CONST.art. 11, Q 176; Oklahoma-OKU. CONST.art. 10, Q 6; South Dakota-S.D. CONST.art. 11, Q 5; Virginia-VA. CONST.art. 10, Q 6; Washington-WASH.
CONST.art. 7, Q 2.
In addition, several other states have adopted similar statutory provisions. See, e.g.,
Hawaii-HAW. REX.STAT.Q 49-11 (1976); Illinois-Revenue Act of 1939, 8 19.6, ILL. REV.
STAT.ch. 120, Q 500.6 (1973); Montana-Mom. REV.CODESANN. Q 84-202 (Cum. Supp.
1977); Nevada-NEX. REV.STAT.Q 361.060 (1977); New Hampshire-N.H. REV.STAT.
ANN.Q72:23 (Supp. 1977); Wisconsin-WIS. STAT.ANN. Q 70.11 (West Cum. Supp. 19781979).
The Utah Legislature enacted a statute using virtually the idenkcal wording as the
constitutional exemption provision. UTAHCODEANN. Q 59-2-1 (1953).
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property is ownership. Although the word "own" is not used in
the Utah constitutional provision, the requirement of ownership
in connection with municipal property should be implied.12The
wording of the exemption provision, "property of the state, counties, cities . . . and municipal ~orporations,"~~
connotes ownership. No requirement that the municipal property be put to any
particular use is expressed.
In contrast, the constitution provides an entirely different
test for exempting religious or charitable property. Such property
must be "used exclusively for either religious worship or charitable purposes."14 Under statutory and grammatical construction,
the use requirement does not apply to municipal property, but
only to property that would not be exempt except for its religious
or charitable use. If the constitutional convention delegates, when
exempting property of public entities, also intended to require
that such property be "used" for public purposes, such requirement most likely would have been express.15
Utah case law supports the proposition that ownership by
one of the enumerated public entities is the only requirement for
exemption from ad valorem taxation. The case of Springville u.
Johnson16 is one of the first and foremost expressions of Utah's
policy regarding the exemption of public entities: "[Tlhe exemption from taxation of the property of cities is so clear and
expressive that there would seem to be no room for any doubt, or
necessity of resorting to any rule of construction. The exemption
is absolute, and depends upon no condition but ownership by the
city."n This view was reinforced in Duchesne County u. State
Tax Commis~ion,~~
a case where no clear majority opinion pre12. The word "owned" did appear in the territorial statute that was the predecessor
to the present constitutional provision: "All property, real and personal, situate and being
in this Territory, is taxable, except: . . . 3. Property owned by this Territory or any
county, city, or school district." 1COMP.LAWS
OF UTAH§ 2009 (1888).
13. UTAHCONST.art. 13, Q 2.
14. Id. (emphasis added).
15. See generally City of San Francisco v. McGovern, 28 Cal. App. 491, 509, 12 P.
980, 987 (1915).
16. 10 Utah 351, 37 P. 577 (1894).
17. Id. a t 356, 37 P. at 578. The City of Springville, a municipal corporation, owned
900 acres of land within its corporate limits from which it derived revenue by renting the
property for pasturage. Taxes assessed against the land were not paid by the city and the
land was sold to the defendant at a tax sale. The city sought toquiet t i t k ¶ % e court held
that the city's leasing of the land for private purposes did not disturb the tax status of
the property. The tax sale was void because ownership by the city was the only condition
of exemption. Although the Springville opinion came down before Utah matured to statehood in 1896, the effect of prior judgments was continued by article 24, § 1 of the Utah
Constitution.
18. 104 Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335 (1943).
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vailed. In Duchesne the state acquired land previously owned by
private interests through foreclosure of mortgages the state had
acquired from a state-owned trust. Upon acquisition by the state,
the lands were removed from the tax rolls. The court addressed
the contention of Duchesne County that the property should be
reinstated upon the tax rolls because the state held the property
in a proprietary capacity and the constitutional exemption provision exempted only state property held in a governmental capacity. The plurality opinion noted that "[i]t is conceded that if the
state holds title in its governmental capacity, the property is
exempt from taxation under the constitutional mandate."lB The
opinion then determined that the government could not hold land
otherwise than in a governmental capacity, and, therefore, the
land must be exempt from taxation. This reasoning was adhered
to by only two of the five justices. The majority of the justices,
in concurring separate opinions, found reference to the
governmental-proprietary distinction unnecessary because mere
ownership of the land by the state required a finding of exempt
In 1976 the Utah Supreme Court, in the case of University
v. Salt Lake County,21reaffirmed its position that the
constitutional exemption provision requires that property be
owned by public entities to be exempt. The university leased
property under a five-year lease with an option to purchase. The
university was in possession and use of the property and had
agreed to pay all taxes levied upon it. Such facts were not enough,
the court held, to provide the university with legal title to the
property. The property was not, therefore, owned by a subdivision
of the state and was subject to taxation.22
of Utah

C. Exempt Entities
In determining the taxability of the interests of Los Angeles
and St. George in the Warner Valley electrical generating plant,
discussion will center on whether the municipalities are included
among the public entities specifically exempted and, if so,
19. Id. at 372,140 P.2d at 338.
20. Id. at 383-84, 140 P.2d at 343-44 (Wolfe, C.J., McDonough & Wade, JJ., separate
concurring opinions).
21. 547 P.2d 207 (Utah 1976).
22. Id. at 208-09. Where ownership is the test, there seems to be little authority for
the proposition that exemption should be limited to land held in a governmental capacity
as opposed to a proprietary capacity. The property need not be put td a public use. 16 E.
McQm~~rn,
supra note 9, # 44.57.
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whether they own the property within the meaning of the exemption provision .23
I.

St. George

The City of St. George is organized and incorporated under
the laws of the State of Utah. As such, St. George obviously is
among the entities contemplated by the provision exempting
from taxation the property of "cities . . . [and] municipal corporation~."~~
2. Los Angeles

Because Los Angeles is a foreign municipality, whether or not
its property interest is exempted under Utah's exemption provision is not as easily determined. While no Utah cases are on
point, the case of City Council v. Timmerman,25 decided by the
Fourth Circuit, is informative:
Unless otherwise expressed, all legislation of a state relating to
cities and towns refers to the cities and towns of that state, and
not of another state or country. This is for the reason that the
state has no control of cities and towns in other states, and from
a governmental standpoint no interest in them. For a state to
attempt to promote the development of cities and towns outside
of its borders by exempting property owned by them from taxation exacted of its own citizens would be so anomalous and
contrary to legislative history and governmental policy that
nothing but the clearest affirmative expression would warrant
such an inference?
23. There are two prevalent types of ad valorem tax exemption provisions. In some
jurisdictions, ownership is the only test for exemption. Exemption in other jurisdictions
is predicated upon the use to which the property is put as well as its ownership. For
example, S.C. CONST.art. 10, Q 4 provides, "There shall be exempted from taxation all
county, township and municipal property used exclusively for public purposes and not for
revenue . . . ." In addition, the following states apply the use test for exemption:
Arkansas-ARK. CONST.art. 16, 8 5; Delaware-DEL. CODEtit. 9, 4 8103 (1974);
Florida-FLA. CONST.art. 7, Q 3; Indiana-h. CODEANN. 5 6-1.1-10-5 (Bums 1978);
Kentucky-KY. CONST. Q 170; Maine-ME. REV. STAT. tit. 36, Q 651 (1964);
Maryland-MD. ANN.CODEart. 81, Q 9 (1975); Massachusetts-MASS. GEN.LAWSANN.
ch. 59, Q 3A (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); Michigan- MI^. COMP.LAWSANN.5 211.7
(Cum. Supp. 1978-1979);Minnesota-Mm. CONST. art. 10, Q 1; New Jersey-N.J. STAT.
-- .
ANN. Q 544-3.3 (West 1960); Oregon-OR. REV.STAT.Q 307,090 (1977); Texas-Tex.
CONST.art. 11, 8 9; West Virginia-W. VA.CODE8 11-3-9 (1974); WyominFWyo. CONST.
art. 15, 5 12.
24. UTAHCONST.art. 13, Q 2.
25. 233 F. 216 (4th Cir. 1916).
26. Id. a t 219.
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Additional case law from other jurisdictions sustains the
Timmerman concept. For instance, a waterworks plant owned by
a Missouri municipality but located in Kansas was held to be
taxable in Kansas.27The Kansas Supreme Court declared that
when a foreign municipality enters the realm of another state it
does not carry with it any of the attributes of its sovereignty and
is thereby subject to the laws of the state it enters just the same
as any p r ~ p r i e t o rAn
. ~ ~interstate toll bridge owned and operated
by a Wisconsin municipality, but spanning the St. Croix River so
that a portion of the bridge rested in Minnesota, was held to be
taxable by the State of M i n n e ~ o t a .The
~ ~ Minnesota Supreme
Court's reasoning in State v. City of Hudson further clarified the
law regarding taxation of foreign municipalities: "The public and
sovereign character of the state owning property in another state
ceases at the state line, with the consequence that its ownership
of property in the foreign state is in its corporate capacity without
any sovereign or public attribute^."^^
The Utah Supreme Court would likely follow the established
precedent of these other jurisidictions. Several policy arguments
support this conclusion. To allow Los Angeles the same exempt
status as St. George would be inequitable. The Warner Valley
Project will create an immediate need for expansion of public
services and facilities during its construction phase and will extend that need throughout the life of the project, working hardships on local government already hard pressed to provide adequate coverage in those areas. While new residents brought to the
area by the project will provide some tax revenue, the revenue
will not provide the money necessary to adequately meet the
27. State ex rel. Taggart v. Holcomb, 85 Kan. 178, 116 P. 251 (1911), appeal
dismissed, 226 U.S. 599 (1912).
28. Id. at 185, 116 P. at 253.
29. State v. City of Hudson, 231 Minn. 127, 42 N.W.2d 546 (1950). But see City of
Louisville v. Babb, 75 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 738 (1935), which
also involved a toll bridge spanning a river into another stae. The district court had
determined that the portion of the bridge located in Indiana was taxable by Indiana since
the bridge was owned and operated by Louisville, Kentucky. The district court found
unconstitutional a statute enacted by the Legislature of Indiana that specifically exempted "[alny bridge . . . when owned either by the State of Indiana . . . or by another
state or by any municipality or political subdivision of such other state." Act of Mar. 11,
1929, ch. 94, § 1, 1929 Ind. Acts 296 (current version a t IND.CODEANN.4 6-1.1-10-3 (Burns
1978)).The circuit court reversed.
In a somewhat related case, land acquired and held for railway purposes by one state
within the borders of another state was ruled to be subject to eminent domain by the state
in which the land was located. Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472 (1924).
30. 231 Minn. 127,130,42 N.W.2d 546,548 (1950). See also Hall v. University of Nev.,
8 Cal. 3d 522,503 P.2d 1363, 105 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S.820 (1973).
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initial growth problems. Mobile home cities, proper waste treatment, adequate police protection, sufficient educational facilities, and construction and maintenance of roads are all challenges
facing local officials. Solutions to these growth-related problems
will require immediate and substantial capital outlay, primarily
by Washington County. If the property of Los Angeles is held to
be exempt from ad valorem taxation, revenues from the Warner
Valley Project will not likely be sufficient to provide the capital
outlay monies required by the accelerated growth.
Adverse environmental effects are also legitimate concerns of
county officials. Los Angeles will have a fifty percent ownership
interest in the new generating facility and will be entitled to half
the generated power, yet it will be immune from these related
concerns. While taxing Los Angeles will not eliminate environmental problems, taxation will aid in finding solutions and reducing inequities. The exemption provision of article 13, section 2 of
the Utah Constitution should not be construed to include Los
Angeles within the terms of the public entities exemption.

D. The Question of Ownership3'
Historically, the Utah Supreme Court has found the ad valorem tax exemption provision to be unambiguous and not open to
c o n s t r ~ c t i o nIt. ~has,
~ therefore, exempted all municipal interests.
Previous cases, however, have dealt with a municipality's ownership and control of the entire property;" the court has not yet
been confronted with a municipality's minority interest. Where
a municipality owns only a twenty-five percent interest in property under consideration, as will St. George, the exemption provision may be subject to construction.
I.

Implications from another ownership jurisdiction

Analysis of the taxability of St. George's minority interest
may be benefited by case law from another jurisdiction. In Georgia, ownership has been the test for exemption from ad valorem
31. Discussion under this section will be limited to the interest of the City of St.
George. Any discussion relative to St. George's ownership interest would be equally
applicable to the interest of h Angeles. Moreover, qualification of the interest of Los
Angeles under the ownership requirement would be fruitless since Los Angdes, as a foreign
corporation, would not be entitled to the ad valorem tax exemption provided for in the
Utah Constitution.
32. See, e.g., Springville v. Johnson, 10 Utah 351, 356, 37 P. 577, 578 (1894).
33. See, e.g., Duchesne County v. State Tax Comm'n, 104 Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335
(1943); Springville v. Johnson, 10 Utah 351, 37 P. 577 (1894).
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taxation. All "public property" of that state has been exempted.:"
An interesting concept was discussed by the Georgia Supreme
Court in Cleveland u. Stewart.35In dictum, the court stated:
Another class of public corporations are those which are founded
for public-although not political or municipal-purposes, and
the whole interest in which belongs to the government. Thus, a
bank, organized by the government for public purposes, is a
public corporation if the whole of the stock and all the interest
in it, reside in the g~vernment.~~

A subsequent Georgia Supreme Court decision implied that
ownership of less than the entire property might result in taxation
of that property. In Sigman u. Brunswick Port Authority, the
court found the property of the port authority to be public property and exempt from taxation. In partial support of its finding,
the court stated, "No private interest exists in the property of the
Authority. The members thereof may not use it for private gain
or income."38
The implication that a private interest in the property might
result in taxation of otherwise exempt property deserves consideration. Applying this analysis to the Warner Valley Project, St.
George's interest may not be "municipal" or "public" property
exempt from ad valorem taxation since the city will not own the
entire interest in the project.
2. Comparison to federal tax concepts

An examination of federal tax decisions provides additional
information for evaluating St. George's exempt status. As a general rule, states are not taxable by the federal government; yet,
when a state engages in business of a private nature, it may open
itself to federal taxation. This principle is illustrated by South
Carolina u. United States.39South Carolina had engaged in the
liquor business and the United States demanded payment from
the state of license taxes imposed generally on all persons dealing
in intoxicating liquors. The United States Supreme Court found
that the state and its agencies were not exempted from the license
tax. The state, by participation in private business, forfeited its
34. GA.CODEANN. 5 92-201 (1974).

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

3 Ga. 283 (1847).

Id. at 291 (citations omitted).
214 Ga. 332, 104 S.E.2d 467 (1958).

Id. at 335, 104 S.E.2d at 470-71 (emphasis added).
199 U.S.437 (1905).
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immunity from taxation.40
Another argument against exemption of St. George's interest
may, by analogy, be drawn from the Internal Revenue Code. For
federal tax purposes, "a joint undertaking merely to share expenses is not a partner~hip."~~
The parties are taxed as separate
entities. However, when more than simple coownership and costsharing is involved, an agreement becomes a partnership for income tax purposes regardless of the intention of the parties." In
Revenue Ruling 68-344," four utilities owned undivided interests
in an electrical generating facility, shared costs of operating the
facility, and also shared the electrical energy generated by it. The
Internal Revenue Service took the position that for federal income
tax purposes the utilities had gone beyond a mere sharing of costs
and had entered into a partnership.
Applying that ruling to the instant situation, it may be reasoned that by entering into such an undertaking with undivided
interests, the participating utilities become a partnership for tax
purposes. It is doubtful that tax immunity would be extended to
the partnership.
3. firpose of the exemption provision

A look at the underlying rationale of the exemption provision
may be helpful in determining the breadth and scope of the municipal immunity provision. Shortly after Utah's municipal immunity provision was adopted, three basic policies embodied in
tax immunity provisions were isolated: first, a desire to prevent
governmental functions and activities from being interfered with
or impeded; second, a desire to avoid the useless formality of
permitting the government to tax itself; and third, a desire to
alleviate the problems of enfor~ernent.~~
Application of these policies to the present case may provide justification for exempting
St. George's interest in the Warner Valley Project from taxation.
First, taxing St. George's interest would have an effect on the
interest rate of the revenue bonds to be acquired. In that limited
sense, the activities of St. George would be impeded. In addition,
the revenue bonds areeto be secured solely by the interest in the
property itself and revenues generated; no tax monies are to be
used. As ad valorem taxes are assessed directly against the prop-

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 463.
Treas. Reg. Q 1.761-l(a) (1956).
Kern, supra note 1, at 79.
Rev. Rul. 68-344, 1968-1 C.B. 569.

0. POND,
LAWOF PUBLIC
U m m 8 404 (3d ed. 1925).

--
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erty, any unpaid tax assessed would result in a claim against the
property.45Second, considering the sovereign state as a whole, for
one political subdivision to tax another would mean that money
taken from one pocket would be put into another. The costs of
administering the tax make it economically impractical to impose since no benefit accrues to the state as a whole. Finally, the
problem of enforcement may also have an effect on the taxability
of St. George's interest. The remedy for unpaid taxes is to satisfy
the tax lien by a sale of the property or interest upon which the
tax is due.46Any unpaid assessment would not result in liability
to the city or require payment by tax monies." A tax sale could,
however, result in the property interest falling into outside hands,
thereby increasing electrical costs to the residents of St. George.4n
Many changes in governmental functions have occurred
since the turn of the century, however, when the above municipal
immunity policies were propounded. Modern notions as to the
extent of municipal functions were likely not foreseeable to the
framers of the state ~ o n s t i t u t i o n An
. ~ ~exemption similar to the
present constitutional provision appeared in a territorial law -of
1876." A constitutional provision permitting a municipality to
own and operate a utility, however, was not added to the constitution until 1933.51Even if the framers intended municipally owned
utilities generally to be exempt, clearly they could not have foreseen a situation such as is presented by the Warner Valley Project. Electrical power was in its early stages of development. It is
possible the framers did not intend to exempt such municipal
property interests. Additionally, exemption of St. George's interest may not be realistic as exemption fails to recognize the distinct interests of various subdivisions of the state. A substantial
45. A tax debt creates a lien against the property assessed. UTAHCODEANN.§ 59-103 (1953).
46. UTAHCODEANN. Q 59-10-33 (1953).
47. A statutory sale of property removes a tax lien against it even if the proceeds of

the sale are insufficient to satisfy the delinquent taxes assessed. San Juan County v. Jen,
Inc., 16 Utah 2d 394, 401 P.2d 952 (1965).
48. 0. POND,supra note 44, a t 8 864. Mr. Pond suggested:
[TJhe motive and purpose of the municipality is to secure adequate and efficient municipal public utility service for its citizens at the most reasonable
possible rate which is often in sharp contrast to the very natural attitude of the
privately owned municipal public utility in its desire to receive the greatest
possible return on its investment . . . .
49. See generally South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 456 (1905).
50. Utah territorial laws provided, "Property belonging to the United States, this
Territory, or any county, city, or town thereof. . . are exempt from taxation." COMP.LAWS
OF UTAH§ 359 (1876).
51. UTAHCONST.art. 11, § 5.
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capital outlay will be required to cope with the population influx
problems associated with the construction of the Warner Valley
Project. Most of that capital outlay will come from Washington
County, the situs of the project, with costs to be shared by county
residents. All of St. George's electrical power allotment will go to
the residents of St. George; other county residents will not receive
the benefit of additional electrical power. To require county, residents residing outside of St. George to share equally in the project
costs without receiving the benefits of additional power casts
upon them an inequitable burden. Taxing the interest of St.
George would redistribute the tax burdens of county residents
more in line with the benefits they receive. The benefit of an
equal tax burden may outweigh other policies arguing for exemption.
4. Summary

While LOBAngeles clearly becomes subject to ad valorem
taxation when operating in Utah, there remains some question
regarding St. George's tax status. There is a risk that a municipality strips itself of its tax immunity when it acquires a minority
interest in a "partnership" entity. Furthermore, the inequities of
the tax burden to be placed on county residents living outside the
City of St. George and the uniquely modem nature of the project
argue against the conclusion that St. George should receive the
benefit of tax immunity for its interest in the project. The courts
of Utah have declared, on the other hand, that the policy of the
state is to exempt all publicly owned property. Ownership has
been the only test." This policy of exempting property owned by
municipalities is an obstacle not likely to be overcome.53

III. USEAND POSSESSORY
TAXES
A. Background
Although, under the M'Culloch doctrine, the land to be
leased for the Warner Valley Project may not be taxed directly
, ~ ~use or possesbecause it is owned by the federal g ~ v e r n m e n tthe
52. See notes 16-22 and accompanying text supra.
53. The courts will probably relegate any narrowing of fhewnership ~eqtliremee&to
the legislature.
54. Federal governmental immunity from state taxation was first enunciated in
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Maryland's attempt to impose a
tax on a federally created bank prompted Chief Justice Marshall's oft-quoted phrase:
"[Tlhe power to tax involves the power to destroy." Id. at 431. Justice Marshall also

1251

TAXATION OF MUNICIPALITIES

137

sion of the land by the project may be subject to taxation." A
Utah statute,56which has been held to be a constitutional limitation on the M'Culloch doctrine," provides for "a tax upon the
possession or other beneficial use enjoyed by any private individual, association, or corporation of any property, real or personal,
which for any reason is exempt from taxation, when such property
is used in connection with a business conducted for profit."5x
Although the tax is levied on use or possession, the amount of the
tax is the same as an ad valorem property tax on the p r o ~ e r t y . ~ ~
reasoned "that the States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede,
burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by
Congress." Id. at 436. Early applications of the M'Culloch immunity by courts were
sweeping. See Note, The Doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity and its Effect upon
Lessees of Federal Property, 21 U. Prrr. L. REV.697,698 (1960). In recent years, however,
federal immunity from state taxation has deteriorated, or a t least has been circumvented.
55. In 1953 Michigan, steering clear of state taxes directly on federal property itself,
enacted legislation designed to tax the use of federal property in the hands of federal
contractors. Act of June 10, 1953, Pub. Act 1953, No. 189, 5 1, 1953 Mich. Pub. Acts 252
(codified a t MICH.COMP.LAWSANN.$211.181 (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979)).The constitutionality of that legislation was challenged in two significant 1958 Supreme Court cases.
United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958), involved a private corporation's lease
of property from the federal government. The Court held that private corporations were
not shielded from state taxes even though part or all of the financial burden of the taxes
eventually might fall on the government. The tax was levied upon the private lessee and
not upon the government or its property. In a companion case, United States v. Township
of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958), a private corporation used a manufacturing plant
owned by the United States in performing several supply contracts the corporation had
with the government. There was no formal lease and no rent was charged. The corporation
used the plant under a terminable permit and agreed not to include any part of the cost
of facilities furnished by the government in the price of goods supplied under the costplus-fixed-fee contracts. Again, the interest was held taxable by the state. After the
Supreme Court affirmed the basic design of the Michigan tax, the way was open for other
states to follow suit, which Utah quickly did.
56. UTAHCODEANN.§ 59-13-73 (1953).
57. Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Peterson, 15 Utah 2d 355, 393 P.2d 391 (1964). Thiokol,
a company engaged in the research and development of the Minute Man missile under a
cost-plus contract, was assessed over $125,000 in taxes for property in its possession that
was owned by the United States. Contentions that the incidence of the tax fell upon the
United States, that Thiokol had no taxable interest in the property, and that the statute
was unconstitutional because it was both discriminatory and discriminatorily applied
were not successful. Although the court did find that the statute had not been applied to
state-owned property, it concluded that the statute was not intentionally misapplied and,
hence, not discriminatory against Thiokol. Id. at 361, 393 P.2d a t 395-96.
The major difference between the Utah tax and the Michigan tax after which it was
patterned is that Utah's applies to the use of both real and personal property, unlike the
Michigan tax, which applies to the use of real property only. The following statutes tax
the use or possession of exempt property: Michigan-MICH. COMP.LAWSANN.§ 211.181
(Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); Nevada-NEV. REV.STAT.$ 361.157, .I59 (1977); U t a h - u ~ A ~
CODEANN.8 59-13-73 (1953).
58. UTAHCODEANN.§ 59-13-73 (1953).
59. Id. 59-13-74.
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In contrast to ad valorem taxes, however, no lien attaches to the
property upon assessment of use taxes," though failure to pay the
tax results in a debt due the county.61

B. Use Tax Provisions
The use tax provisions of the Utah Code delineate four basic
prerequisites to taxation." The property must be: (1)possessed
or beneficially used; (2) exempt from taxation; (3) enjoyed by a
private individual, association, or corporation; and (4) used in
connection with a business conducted for profit." The first two
requirements may be dismissed summarily as being satisfied in
the present case. The leasehold interests of St. George and Los
Angeles in the federal lands are possessory and unquestionably
beneficial to each. Additionally, the property of the federal government upon which the project is situated is not subject to ad
valorem taxation." Remaining for consideration are the last two
requirements. If it is determined that St. George and Los Angeles
are "private" corporations for the purposes of the Warner Valley
Project and use the property in connection with a business conducted for profit, the municipal interests will be taxable by the
state and its subdivisions.
1. Private?

It must first be determined whether the municipalities of Los
Angeles and St. George become private entities when operating
an electrical generating plant. Los Angeles takes a private status
upon entering Utah because a municipality is universally considered private in a foreign state." For different reasons, under the
Utah use tax statute St. George may also be considered private
in its role in the Warner Valley Project.
The Utah use tax specifically applies to private corporations.
Municipal corporations are not commonly thought to be private.
60. Id. 5 59-13-75.
61. Id. 5 59-13-76.
62. Section 59-13-73 levies a tax on the use or possession of property; it does not levy
an ad valorem tax directly against the property itself. Article 13, 6 2 of the Utah Constitution exempting "property o f . . . cities [and] municipal corporations" does not apply to
use taxes because the constitutional exemption provision applies only to ad valorem taxes.
See State Tax Comm'n v. City of Logan, 88 Utah 406,415-177547.2d 1197~f201-02TI936R
16 E. MCQUILLIN,
supra note 9, 8 44.57. For a detailed history and analysis of 8 59-13-73,
see Note, The Utah Tax on the Use of Tax-Exempt Boperty, 9 UTAHL. REV.415 (1964).
63. UTAHCODEANN.5 59-13-73 (1953).
64. United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 469 (1958).
65. See notes 26-30 and accompanying text supra.
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A distinction between the two terms is made in another tax statute aimed at certain corporations "whether the corporations are
municipally or privately owned."66 Legislative use of the term
"private corporations" and exclusion of the term "municipal corporations" from the use tax provisions may manifest an intent by
the legislature to exempt municipal corporations from taxation.
It should not be concluded, however, that a municipality can
never be considered private. The governmental-proprietary distinction" that has arisen mainly in the area of tort liability provides a useful basis for determining when, if ever, a municipality
is functioning in a private capacity for tax purposes." Proprietary
in nature, in tort law, is equivalent to private in nature? Consequently, if the governmental-proprietary distinction is applicable
66. UTAHCODEANN.8 59-15-4(b)(1) (1953) (emphasis added).
67. For a concise history of the emergence of the governmental-proprietary distinction, see Duchesne County v. State Tax Comm'n, 104 Utah 365,140 P.2d 335 (1943). Every
jurisdiction but South Carolina and Florida has accepted the distinction between
"governmental" and "proprietary" functions. Davis v. Provo City Corp., 1 Utah 2d 244,
THELAWOF TORTS§ 131, a t 979 (4th
247 n.1, 265 P.2d 415, 417 n.1 (1953); W. PROSSER,
ed. 1971).
68. In the United States, governmental entities have generally been subject to tort
liability when performing proprietary functions, but immune when performing governsupra note 67, a t 978-80. The trend, however, is away from
mental functions. W. PROSSER,
tort immunity; in fact, there is a steady march to eliminate it altogether. In Jivelekas v.
City of Worland, 546 P.2d 419 (Wyo. 1976), the court defined sovereign or governmental
immunity as the "principle [that] holds that the state, its subdivisions and municipal
entities may not be held liable for a tortious act perpetrated while engaged in a governmental function." Id. a t 425 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Justice Rose in writing
the majority opinion advocated the abolishment of governmental immunity; the two other
justices dissented as to that issue but eventually concurred in Oroz v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 575 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1978). The Wyoming Supreme Court in Oroz completely
abrogated governmental immunity from tort liability in that state. In following the trend
away from immunity, the court cited the appendix to Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544
P.2d 1153 (1975), which indicated that 30 states, as of Mar. 30, 1973, had completely or
partially abolished immunity. The Wyoming court noted that other states had taken
action since the Hicks opinion, raising to 36 the number of states following the trend. 575
P.2d a t 1157.
The appendix in Hicks is not entirely correct. It incorrectly lists Utah as a jurisdiction
having abolished governmental immunity. UTAHCODEANN. § 63-30-3 (Supp. 1978) provides, "Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, all governmental entities are
immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a govermental function

....

9,

The New Mexico Supreme Court, following the trend away from immunity, noted
that it had "long recognized that the doctrine [of immunity] is not applicable to municipalities when engaged in a proprietary function," and then proceeded to abrogate immunity when engaged in a governmental function. Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 590,544 P.2d
1153, 1155 (1975).
69. In wrestling with the governmental-proprietary character of municipalities, the
courts have equated "proprietary" capacity with "private" or "corporate" capacity. W.
PROSSER,
supra note 67, at 977-78.
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to the Utah use tax provisions and St. George's interest in the
Warner Valley Project is ruled to be proprietary in nature, St.
George's interest in the project will meet the private enjoyment
requirement of the use tax provision. There are reasons to believe
that the Utah Legislature, cognizant of the governmentalproprietary distinction, could have intended to tax municipalities
functioning as utilities.
Under the governmental-proprietary test applied in Utah,
St. George's interest in the project will probably be found to be
proprietary. The state's Governmental Immunity Act specifically
immunizes governmental entities "from suit for any injury which
The facresults from the exercise of a governmental f~nction."~"
tors to be considered in determining whether a function is governmental or proprietary are: (1)whether the act is for the common
good of the entire state and is generally regarded as a public
responsibility, (2) whether there is any special pecuniary profit7'
or corporate benefit to the city, and (3) whether it is of such a
nature as to be in competition with free e n t e r p r i ~ e . ~ ~
Application of these factors to the Warner Valley Project
indicates that the project could be considered proprietary. The
project is not for the benefit of the state at large, or even for the
entirety of Washington County; it will furnish power to St.
George only. Furnishing electrical power cannot be considered a
public responsibility because private corporations also perform
this function and the operation of utilities by municipalities is
voluntary rather than compelled.73Moreover, the city competes
with private utilities and will receive revenue from the sale of
electrical energy. Consequently, the city will definitely benefit
from the facility.
In addition to the above analysis, case law of neighboring
states supports the classification of a public utility as proprietary
in a taxation setting." And, importantly, the United States Supreme Court has stated that "[ilt is no part of the essential
70. UTAHCODEANN. 8 63-30-3 (Supp. 1978).
71. Cf. Wendler v. City of Great Bend, 181 Kan. 753, 764, 316 P.2d 265, 274 (1957)
(special pecuniary profit test replaced with "commercial in nature" test).
72. Compare Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1975) with Alder
v. Salt Lake City, 64 Utah 568, 569-71, 231 P. 1102, 1102-03 (1924).
73. See UTAHCONST.art. 11, 8 5; UTAHCODEANN. $ #-&-I4 (1953)74. City of Phoenix v. Moore, 57 Ariz. 350, 113 P.2d 935 (1941); Town of Pine Bluffs
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 79 Wyo. 262,333 P.2d 700 (1958). The Idaho Supreme Court
recognized that an electrical utility is generally conceded to be proprietary in nature,
noting, "'that in the operation and distribution of electrical power the City of Idaho Falls
[was] acting in a proprietary capacity."' Hunke v. Foote, 84 Idaho 391, 396,373 P.2d 322,
324 (1962) (quoting the trial court's finding).
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governmental functions of a State to provide means of transportation, supply artificial light, water and the like."75
Utah's governmental-proprietary function test and case law
from other jurisdictions provide strong arguments for treating the
City of St. George as "proprietary" and, therefore, "private" for
purposes of applying the use tax. to the city's interests in the
Warner Valley Project. Doubts should be resolved in favor of
taxation. The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the use tax
statute should be broadly interpreted to effectuate the purpose of
its enactment, which was "to close any gaps in the tax laws by
imposing a tax on any property possessed or used in connection
with a business for profit which was otherwise exempt."" Subjecting municipalities such as St. George and Los Angeles to the
use tax would not contravene the express language of the statute
and would allow a "gap" in the tax laws to be closed.
2. Business entered into for profit?

St. George and Los Angeles might be able to avoid taxation
under Utah's use tax provisions despite the conclusions drawn
above if it can be shown that the Warner Valley Project is not a
business entered into for profit. However, the determination that
both municipalities play proprietary roles is nearly dispositive of
the business for profit question as well. Satisfaction of the second
prong of Utah's proprietary test requires a finding of special pecuniary profit or corporate benefit; in fact, public utilities have been
generally conceded to be competitive businesses for profit in those
jurisdictions that have considered the question.
The case against Los Angeles is even more conclusive than
the one against St. George. Activities carried on by municipalities outside their native states are almost universally classified
as businesses conducted for profit. For example, in City of Cincinnati v. Commonwealth ex rel. Reeves," the Kentucky Court of
Appeals construed an income tax exemption for corporations not
organized or conducted for pecuniary profit. The court conceded
that while Cincinnati was not organized or conducted primarily
for profit, it did have the expectation of pecuniary benefits in the
particular activity of acquiring and conducting its railroad enterprise. Therefore, it was not exempt from taxation on the income
derived from the railroad enterprise.
75. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 172 (1911).
76. Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Peterson, 15 Utah 2d 355, 358, 393 P.2d 391, 393 (1964)
(emphasis added).
77. 292 Ky. 597, 167 S.W.2d 709 (1942).
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While the weight of analysis supports the conclusion that St.
George and Los Angeles will be operating a business conducted
for profit within the meaning of the use tax provisions, there is a
Nevada Supreme Court ruling, based on a situation similar to
that presented by the Warner Valley Project, reaching the opposite conclusion. However, the Nevada case is not controlling upon
Utah courts and can, moreover, be attacked for faulty reasoning.
Clark County v. City of Los Angele~'~
involved a power generating
project operated by Los Angeles and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD). The generators and related
facilities were owned by the federal government, but, like Utah,
Nevada had enacted legislation rendering taxable the lease or
other use of exempt property.79
The Nevada Supreme Court held that Los Angeles and
MWD were not engaged in a business for profit within the meaning of the statute because they were serving governmental needs.n')
The justices reasoned that "[allthough the respondents obtain
surplus funds, these are not distributed to private shareholders
as dividends, nor are there private shareholder^."^^
The flaw in the court's reasoning may be traced to a misapprehension of the scope of three California casesE2cited as support
for the holding. The implication throughout those three cases is
that to have a "profit" a private shareholder or individual must
receive a benefit. The cases were decided under section 214 of the
California Revenue and Taxation Codes3which exempts nonprofit
(religious, hospital, or charitable) corporations from ad valorem
taxation?' Besides referring to an ad valorem rather than a use
78. 91 Nev. 309, 535 P.2d 158 (1975).
79. NEV.REV.STAT.# 361.157, .I59 (1977).
80. The basic issue of the case was whether the rights to and use of hydroelectric
generators and related facilities on the Nevada side of Hoover Dam by Los Angeles and
MWD were subject to taxation by Nevada under its use tax. It was asserted in crossclaims
filed against Clark County that taxation was not proper because "the State of Nevada
had elected to receive annual payments of $300,000 from the Federal Bureau of Reclamation in lieu of any taxes by the State or its subdivisions, thereby 'preempting' the subject
of taxation." Brief for Appellant at 3, Clark County v. City of Los Angeles, 91 Nev. 309,
535 P.2d 158 (1975) (citation omitted).
81. 91 Nev. at 312, 535 P.2d a t 160.
82. Sutter Hosp. v. City of Sacramento, 39 Cal. 2d 33, 244 P.2d 390 (1952); San
Francisco Boys' Club, Inc. v. County of Mendocino, 254 Cal. App. 2d 548, 62 Cal. Rptr.
294 (1967); Sarah Dix Hamlin School v. City of San Francis-coo221 Cal.&p. 2d 336, 34
Cal. Rptr. 376 (1963).
83. (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
84. Sutter Hosp. v. City of Sacramento, 39 Cal. 2d 33, 35, 244 P.2d 390, 391 (1952);
San Francisco Boys' Club, Inc. v. County of Mendocino, 254 Cal. App. 2d 548, 549, 62
Cal. Rptr. 294, 295 (1967); Sarah Dix Hamlin School v. City of San Francisco, 221 Cal.
App. 2d 336, 338, 34 Cal. Rptr. 376, 377-78 (1963).
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tax, section 214 is separate and distinct from the state constitutional provisions exempting the property of cities and municipalities? Since municipal property is exempted elsewhere, section
214 and cases decided under it need only focus on those corporate
organizations that have shareholders. Wholesale application of
the tests developed under section 214 of the California Revenue
and Tax Code to cases under the Nevada use tax statute results
in a comparison of apples and oranges.RB
The precedential value of the Clark County case is easily
outweighed by the authorities equating private and proprietary
functions with businesses conducted for profit. A municipality
should be considered as engaged in a business for profit under the
use tax statute when it obtains surplus funds from a business that
itself constitutes a proprietary function.

IV. CONCLUSION
As municipally owned utilities seek to combat the energy
shortage by combining their capital resources with other utilities
85. The California Constitution provision provided that:
In addition to such exemptions as are now provided in this Constitution, the
Legislature may exempt from taxation all or any portion of property used exclusively for religious, hospital or charitable purposes and owned by . . . corporations . . . not conducted for profit and no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.
CAL.CONST.art. 13, 8 l c (1879, repealed 1974, current version a t art. 13, 8 4) (emphasis
added). The first phrase of 8 l c is critical to understanding the content and breadth of
the provision. The property of cities and municipal corporations had been expressly exempted by § 1 of art. 13: "[Plroperty . . . such as may belong to this State, or to any
county, city and county, or municipal corporation within this State shall be exempt from
taxation . . ." CAL.CONST
art. 13, $ 1 (1879, repealed 1974, current version at art. 13, 8
3). Since all municipal property was exempted elsewhere, 9 l c refers to and is focused only
upon corporations that have private shareholders or similar organizational structures.
Consequently, it is understandable and even expected that the phraseology of the provision be couched in nonmunicipal terms. There was no need to adopt construction or
wording designed to include municipalities, which have no shareholders, because municipalities had been previously expressly exempted.
86. Unlike the situation in the California cases, municipalities were not expressly
exempted elsewhere in the Nevada statutes at issue in Clark County. No indication, either
express or implied, appeared in the Nevada statutes that municipalities were designed to
be excluded from taxation. A "business conducted for profit" was not defined, nor did the
statutes require on their face the existence of private shareholders or a distribution of
dividends. The Nevada statutes were as conducive to an interpretation that municipalities
acting in proprietary capacities should be included as businesses conducted for profit as
to an interpretation that they should be excluded. In addition, the California provisions
have reference only to ad valorem taxation while the Nevada statutes involve a tax on
possession or use. The purpose, construction, and focus of 8 214 of the California Revenue
and Taxation Code derived from 8 l c of that state's constitution are not identical to those
of the Nevada statutes.

.
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in a commonly owned installation, the question of the taxability
of municipal interests in public utilities will emerge. In jurisdictions where the use of the property also has significance for tax
exemption purposes, the governmental-proprietary distinction
will play a vital role.
The breadth of the property and use tax statutes is the critical issue to be resolved. Are Los Angeles and St. George exempt
from the payment of an ad valorem tax levied directly upon the
electrical generating plant itself and accompanying
improvements? And, are their possessory leasehold interests in
federal land exempt from use taxation?
It appears certain that the property interests of Los Angeles,
as a foreign municipality in Utah, will be subject to both ad
valorem taxation and use taxation. The taxability of the interests
of St. George, a domestic corporation, is a much more difficult
question.
St. George will not likely be subjected to an ad valorem tax
on its interest in the electrical generating plant. Utah courts will
probably find the policy of exempting publicly owned property an
insurmountable obstacle and will construe the exemption provision broadly to include any ownership interest. But, since the
policy of tax exemption is generally confined to the area of ad
valorem taxation, greater latitude is available to the courts in
interpreting the use tax provisions. Since the Utah Supreme
Court has held that the use tax provisions of the Utah Code were
enacted to close any gaps in the tax laws, it is likely the court will
close a gap by finding St. George subject to the Utah use tax.

Dale C. Hatch

